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ABSTRACT 
 
SPECIFYING SECURITY REQUIREMENTS  
IMPROVEMENT FOR IEEE STANDARD 830 
 
Jacob D. McCarty 
 
This paper presents a concept on how the software requirements 
specifications template provided by IEEE Standard 830 could be updated 
to ensure that security is analyzed during the early stages of the software 
development lifecycle.  This improved security requirement in the 
software requirements specifications will ensure that software developers 
will have a more clear understanding of how to protect digital information.       
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Professionals in the field of software engineering have taken many steps to 
enhance the design of software to ensure secure information.  Security has 
traditionally been an afterthought of the computer software design process [16].  
Current standards recommend that security be evaluated in the software 
requirements specifications.  “It is not that developers are incapable of producing 
[secure] software … it is just that they are not sufficiently motivated to do so” 
[15].  Developers generally do not understand the security requirements of 
software systems that they are designing; therefore, such security requirements 
are either ignored or not adequately fulfilled.   
 
This paper presents a discussion of current software practices of developing the 
software requirements specifications.  This document begins by presenting a brief 
background of software engineering processes and the phases in which software 
requirements specifications are developed.  Next it presents the Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers, IEEE, standard for software requirements 
specifications.  Third it presents examples of current legislation and regulations 
surrounding the use of sensitive information.  Finally, a possible solution on how 
to further define security in the software requirements specifications is presented. 
1.1 Statement of the Problem 
Current practices for developing software requirements specifications appear to 
be inadequate.  The current software requirements specifications standard does 
not provide a clear description on how to specify security requirements.  This 
document provides a detailed method for improving the IEEE standard regarding 
security.  The present IEEE Standard 830 places security information in the 
software attributes section and does not provide a clear description of how to 
specify security requirements.  This thesis will provide a suggested outline for 
developing software requirements specifications with improved security visibility.   
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2 BACKGROUND 
Software engineering can be described as a process in which a computer program 
and its supporting documentation are developed.  There are many types of 
software process models that are used to manage how a software product is 
developed.  According to Ian Sommerville, “Most software process models are 
based on one of three general models or paradigms of software development” 
[11].  The three general models are: the waterfall approach, iterative development, 
and component-based. 
2.1 The Software Process 
All of the software models produce many different types of documentation to 
describe the software being developed.  These documentation sets serve as 
contracts between the users of the system, the client asking for the product being 
developed, and the software development team.  After development is completed, 
testing of the software begins, based on the development documentation, to 
ensure that all aspects of the software were developed to the software 
requirements specifications.  This paper will describe the IEEE standard to 
developing software requirements specifications and make recommendations to 
update the standard to meet the needs of organizations developing software.  This 
paper will explain the different models and techniques to developing software and 
point out the specific location in which software requirements specifications are 
created.   
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In 1968 and 1969, software engineering became the official practice for 
developing computer software architectures and designs during two NATO 
Software Engineering Conferences [10].  During these conferences, software 
engineering was compared to computer science and practitioners of both 
disciplines discussed how they could work together to develop better software 
products.  The discussion was completed by a group comprised of academic and 
industry professionals.  These conferences set the concept of computer software 
development being a set of phases: conception, design, implementation, testing, 
and maintenance [10].  Software models take a different approach to completing 
these phases, but every model discussed hereafter contains the concepts of the 
phases put forward at the conference.     
 
In the forthcoming sections there is a brief description of three different software 
lifecycle models.  Note that in each of the descriptions there is a specific notation 
stating which phase or phases the software requirements specifications are 
developed. 
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2.1.1 The Waterfall Model 
The waterfall model, created by W. W. Royce in 1970, is a set of 
incremental steps.  Each step is considered a phase in which its 
predecessor must be completed prior to moving forward in the 
development process.  This lifecycle model includes the following phases, 
listed in order: requirement definition, system and software design, 
implementation and unit testing, integration and system testing, and 
operation and maintenance.  The waterfall model provides a means by 
which developers can reevaluate a previous phase.  If a problem is 
discovered, the development team suspends the current phase and reenters 
the previous phase to correct problems prior to moving forward with 
development.  Due to the specific set of phases and how they are to be 
completed, the waterfall model is typically not a good model for use in 
software design where the system requirements are not well understood or 
are expected to rapidly change throughout the process.  During the 
development of the waterfall model, security was not an issue that needed 
to be highlighted; therefore, it was left out of the model for analysis.  The 
software requirements specifications is completed in the second phase of 
the waterfall model [11].  Figure 1 displays a graphical representation of 
the waterfall model. 
Software 
requirements 
specifications are 
developed here.
Requirements 
Definition
System and 
Software Design
Implementation 
and Unit Testing
Integration and 
System Testing
Operation and 
Maintenance
 
Figure 1: The Waterfall Model [11] 
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2.1.2 The Spiral Model 
The spiral model, created by B. W. Boehm in 1988, is represented as a 
series of spirals.  The software process begins in the innermost spirals and 
work outward.  Each iteration of the spiral focuses on a different aspect of 
the software being developed.  The spiral model analyzes each cycle in 
four ways: objective setting, risk assessment and reduction, development 
and validation, and planning.  The main focus of the spiral model is risk; if 
risk is determined to be too high, then the project is ended and not 
completed.  During the risk assessment a security analysis should be 
completed, if the security risk is too high then the project would be ended.  
The software requirements specifications are completed in one cycle of the 
spiral [11].  Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the spiral 
model. 
 
Figure 2: The Spiral Model [11] 
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2.1.3 The Unified Software Development Process 
The unified process, created by J. Rumbaugh, I. Jacobson, and G. Booch 
in 1999, is divided into four areas of focus: inception, elaboration, 
construction, and transition.  The unified process is considered an iterative 
process.  Each of the specific phases is reviewed in an iterative fashion 
followed by the complete process being iterated for the next component in 
the system.  Each iteration of the process focuses on a specific module in 
the complete system based on the ranked business needs.  This model 
focuses on business concerns rather than technical concerns.  The software 
requirements specifications are completed throughout all phases, but the 
majority of the specifications are developed during the inception and 
elaboration phases.  The unique factor in the unified process is that it 
focuses on what it considers “six fundamental best practices.”  These 
fundamentals are: develop software iteratively, manage requirements, 
develop user component-based architectures, visually model software, 
verify software quality, and control changes to software [11].  During 
development with the unified process model, security requirements would 
be gathered as a step within each iteration of a phase.  During the 
inception phase security would be specified as an overview.  During the 
elaboration phase, security would be specified in software requirements 
specifications.  The construction phase would focus on how to code 
securely, and in the transition phase physical security measures would be 
placed into the system.  Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of the 
unified process model. 
 
 
Figure 3: The Unified Software Development Process [11] 
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2.2 IEEE Standard 830 
The Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, IEEE, is a nonprofit 
professional association that strives to advance technology.  It is 
comprised of industry professionals, academic professionals, and students.  
IEEE has produced many standards for engineering by using a set of tested 
and scrutinized methods.  “Our standards are developed in a unique 
environment that builds consensus in an open process based on input from 
all interested parties” [7].  IEEE believes that by providing and defining 
standards for the technology industry, organizations will have the 
following benefits: 
“...market growth for new and emerging technologies, reduced 
development time and cost, sound engineering practices, 
decreased trading costs and lowered trade barriers, increased 
product quality and safety, reduced market risks, and protection 
against obsolescence” [7]. 
 
There are currently three publications of the IEEE Standard 830: Release 
1984, Release 1993, and Release 1998.  These standards describe what a 
high-quality software requirements specifications document should 
contain and how it should be organized.  The only main difference 
between the three documents is how the information is visually presented 
in each release, but the concepts and templates are essentially the same.  
IEEE states that all of their standards must be reviewed every five years. 
2.2.1 Software Requirements Specifications Qualities 
The software requirements specifications should be an unambiguous, 
verifiable base for an agreement between the customer and the developer 
as to what is to be designed.  This understanding should be based on the 
following characteristics of good software requirements specifications: 
“correct, unambiguous, complete, consistent, ranked for importance and/or 
stability, verifiable, modifiable, and traceable” [13].  The main goal of the 
document is to reduce the cost – both time and financial – of the 
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development process.  During the later phases of the project, the software 
requirements specifications is used to validate and verify that all 
contractual agreements have been achieved by the development team, and 
also serves as a reference to individuals or organizations performing 
maintenance on the software product after it has been delivered to the 
customer [2].     
 
IEEE Standard 830 provides templates for the software requirements 
specifications to the industry.  A sample software requirements 
specifications template is provided in section 6.1.  This template shows 
many aspects that are needed to properly specify requirements for a 
software project; a description of the sections of the template is provided 
in the following sections. 
2.2.1.1 SRS: Introduction Section 
The introduction section is designed to provide information to the user that 
might be helpful while progressing through the software requirements 
specifications document.  The purpose section is to specify the reason for 
the software requirements specifications as well as the target audience.  
The scope section provides the names of the software products to be 
designed and the main goals and objectives of the system.  If there is 
anything specific the software product will not accomplish, this is to be 
clearly stated here.  The definitions, acronyms, and abbreviations section 
provides a reference area for the reader to refer to while reading the 
document.  This can be a bulleted list or in any format, but should explain 
any unclear terms or technical aspects that either the customer or the 
developer might not understand while reading the software requirements 
specifications.  The references section is expected to list any referenced 
documents during the creation of the software requirements specifications.  
The overview section should explain what the rest of the software 
requirements sections either mean or entail [13]. 
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2.2.1.2 SRS: Overall Description Section 
The overall description area provides information on how each of the 
factors of the system affects the software requirements specifications.  
This section is not to include specific requirements; specific requirements 
are placed in the specific requirements section of the document.  The 
product perspective section should describe the system in terms of other 
products, either on the market or currently being used in the old 
environment – the system being replaced.  The product functions section is 
to briefly describe the major components of the system being developed.  
Graphical representation may be presented in this section to help the 
reader understand each function’s relationship to other functions and the 
system as a whole.  User characteristics should describe the users’ 
knowledge base.  This should not provide requirements the users will need 
to use the system, but provide a better understanding as to why the system 
is being designed in a specific manner.  The constraints section is to 
describe what constraints might be put on the system being designed.  For 
instance, if the software being designed is to be used on cellular devices; 
then, the application will have less memory to operate in comparison to an 
application being deployed on a desktop.  Assumptions and dependencies 
are listed in the software requirements specifications because most 
systems do not perform correctly due to developers or users assuming that 
the other party has a clear understanding of a requirement which might not 
have been acknowledged by the other party.  The items listed in the 
assumptions and dependencies area are to explain requirements that might 
affect the software requirements specifications [13].  For example: 
“…an assumption may be that a specific operating system will 
be available on the hardware designated for the software product.  
If, in fact, the operating system is not available, the SRS 
[software requirements specifications] would then have to 
change accordingly” [13].   
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The apportioning of requirements section is used to explain certain 
features or functionality that might be delayed for future releases or 
versions of the software. 
2.2.1.3 SRS: Specific Requirements 
The specific requirements area is to specify the software requirements in a 
clear and technical manner so the developers can complete development to 
the needs of the customer.  The external interfaces section provides a 
detailed description of all inputs into the system and outputs returned by 
the system.  This is completed by breaking down all the data 
inputs/outputs and describing the details about them.  The functions 
section should provide technical details about all of the functions provided 
in the software.  This is completed using both textual and graphical 
descriptions of the following areas: validity checks on the inputs, exact 
sequence of operations, responses to abnormal situations, effects of 
parameters, and relationship of outputs to inputs.  The performance 
requirements section should provide system performance requirements.  
For example, time expectations for specific operations, the number of 
terminals to be supported, and the type of information to be handled.  The 
logical database requirements section provides a description of the 
database, if necessary.  The features that the section analyzes are: types of 
information used by various functions, frequency of use, accessing 
capabilities, data entities and their relationships, integrity constraints, and 
data retention requirements.  The standard compliance section provides 
items that constrict the design to specific formats.  These typically occur 
during reporting of information in the system for audit purposes – a 
specific report for a government organization.  The software system 
attributes section defines the reliability, availability, security, 
maintainability, and portability of the system.  External interface 
requirements provide information to help the developers and users of the 
system understand how the new software will interact with other entities 
in the system’s environment.  [13].   
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This paper will discuss in more detail suggested methods on improving the 
IEEE standard concerning security.  The standard places the majority of 
security information into the software attributes section and does not 
provide a clear understanding to what security requirements mean or how 
they should be developed. 
2.2.2 SRS: Security Requirements Evolution 
Security Requirements in IEEE Standard 830 have not evolved during 
each release.  In all releases, IEEE Standard 830-1984, IEEE Standard 
830-1993, and IEEE Standard 830-1998, the security requirements were 
specified under the subsection of attributes in the specific requirements 
section.  The security specifications area stated that it should address 
factors such as “accidental or malicious access, use, modification, 
destruction, or disclosure” [2].   
2.3 Legislation and Regulations 
New legislation, regulations, and corporate policies affect how 
information technology is used to secure sensitive information.  
Legislation is currently being developed throughout the federal and state 
levels of the United States government to ensure that personal information 
is not disclosed without the explicit consent of the United States’ 
economic consumers.  The forthcoming sections will describe some 
examples of such regulatory efforts.   
2.3.1 United States Federal Legislation 
Information security is gaining momentum throughout the United States.  
Federal legislation is pushing the information technology sector to secure 
sensitive information.  A few examples of these laws follow. 
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2.3.1.1 Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, also known as 
FERPA, protects students’ education records.  Information that is 
considered private according to FERPA includes, but is not limited to, 
academic performance and financial account information.  This federal 
regulation does permit directory information to be released to the public 
under the guidelines that such information is public knowledge [5]. 
2.3.1.2 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, also 
known as HIPAA, provides regulatory standards on how electronic 
medical information is to be handled by health care organizations.  This 
statute provides protection against many abuses in the health care industry.  
It specifically states that if an individual or organization gains 
unauthorized access to any unique health care identifier, personal 
identifiable medical information, or discloses such information that the 
individual or organization is punishable by fine and/or imprisonment [1]. 
2.3.1.3 Financial Services Modernization Act 
The Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, also known as the 
Gramm-Leach Bliley Act, was designed to protect consumer financial 
information.  The Gramm-Leach Bliley Act provides a means for 
enforcement agencies to enforce two regulations: the Financial Privacy 
Rule and the Safeguards Rule [14].  The Financial Privacy Rule states that 
financial institutions must inform consumers of the collection of personal 
financial information, with whom it will be shared, and how the financial 
information is going to be protected.  This rule also provides a means by 
which consumers can object to their information being shared with third 
parties [6].  The Safeguards Rule clearly states that organizations that 
collect financial information must take measures to protect the information 
they are provided during transmission and storage [14].   
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2.3.1.4 Public Company Account Reform and Investor Protection Act 
The Public Company Account Reform and Investor Protection Act of 
2002, also known as Sarbanes-Oxley, sets forth a few parameters that are 
pertinent to software design.  One of the parameters requires financial 
audit information to be kept securely for a period of five years.  Another 
parameter states that any mutilation or altering of information is 
punishable by fine and/or imprisonment.  One other parameter that can 
directly affect how software is designed states that all communications, 
physical or electronic, must be stored if it pertains to an audit/review or 
financial information that would/could be audited [12]. 
2.3.2 United States State Legislation 
There is currently Security Breach Legislation in more than half of the 
United States.  These legislative laws are not the only state laws that can 
affect software engineering, but they provide a clear example how state 
law can affect the design of software systems.  Figure 4 provides a visual 
understanding of the states with current security breach legislation and the 
year their legislation went into effect. 
 
The state laws regulating personal information are designed to force 
industry to take measures to prevent personal information from being 
stolen or disclosed to unauthorized individuals.  The laws state that 
personal information is, but not limited to: social security number, driver’s 
license, credit card number, debit card number, financial account number, 
passwords, personal identification numbers, security codes, access codes, 
and et cetera [3].  All of the current legislation specifically states that if the 
information disclosed was unencrypted that the individuals of said states 
must be notified that their personal information may have been disclosed 
without consent [9]. 
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Figure 4: Security Breach Law Enactments [9] 
2.3.3 Corporate Policies and Standards 
Role-based access control policies are typically seen in corporate 
regulations.  Most organizations set a specific type of role for each of its 
users.  This role based access control policy provides specific credentials 
to be met prior to permitting a user access to the digital information 
requested.  Information that corporate organizations store, manipulate, and 
transmit is accepted as needing to be classified and secured.   
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2.3.3.1 Information Management Security Policy 
One of the first steps to creating an information management security 
policy is specifying the organization’s assets.  These assets range from 
employees to digital information.  The next step is defining how to protect 
the organization’s assets.  A closer look at digital information is needed.   
 
Digital information is typically stored in data centers within an 
organization; users and systems that try to access the data must clearly be 
authorized to have such access.  These roles are defined based on the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability policies with which the digital 
information must comply.  The purpose for the role based access policies 
are simple: if a user changes information that he/she is not authorized to 
change, then the integrity and confidentiality of the information is 
compromised.  If a system cannot retrieve information that is needed, then 
the availability is compromised.  If proprietary information is disclosed to 
persons who are not authorized to have access, then the confidentiality of 
the information is compromised.  Corporations must establish role-based 
access controls for their information to retain all three qualities: 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability [4]. 
2.3.3.2 Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard 
The credit card industry in 2006 released the Payment Card Industry Data 
Security Standard.  This standard placed many restrictions on 
organizations and corporations that accept credit cards as a form of 
payment.  If organization or corporations do not comply with said 
standard, their status as credit card processor could be revoked and the 
corporations could be fined.  Some of the restrictions include the 
following: build and maintain a secure network, protect cardholder data, 
maintain a vulnerability management program, implement strong access 
control measures, regularly monitor and test networks, and maintain an 
information security policy [8].  
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2.4 Current Research in the Profession 
Microsoft and Compuware worked together to perform a study of security 
practices in the United States and Europe.  On October 9, 2006, they 
released the results of their study titled: How Secure is Your Application 
Development?  Their claim is that: “security is only as good as the 
weakest link” [22].  They analyzed the completed breakdown of a web-
application to show that the weakest link is the development of the 
application.  Looking at the protection levels of a web-application there 
can be five areas that security needs to be in place: desktop layer, transport 
layer, access layer, network layer and application layer.   
 
The desktop layer is where the end user is located.  He or she decides to 
access the web-application.  At the desktop layer the end user would be 
performing his or her part in the security process by having an anti-virus 
program fully operational and up-to-date.  The next layer during the 
process of the end user accessing the web-application presents the 
transport layer.  The transport layer is represented by the World Wide 
Web.  The security measure at this stage in the process is an encrypted 
connection.  During the access layer a firewall verifies that the 
communication passing through it to the web-application is an authentic 
connection.  An intrusion detection system would be deployed to monitor 
the network layer.  The user has now reached the application layer.  This 
layer has been developed and placed on the web for viewing.  Therefore 
the only security measures now in place are the built-in application 
protections.   
 
The problem with relying on built in application protection is that most 
developers either don’t understand the security requirements or they see 
security requirements as a limiting agent on the application [22].  
Developers generally see security as a means by which to slow the 
application down, or not provide the access that the developer feels the 
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application deserves.  Compuware and Microsoft both claim that the 
weakest link in this example is the application itself.  “… security 
vulnerabilities at the application level are a form of design or coding 
defect…” [22].  Compuware and Microsoft have released a series of 
security approaches for developers.  These include: assess business risk, 
develop the right architecture, code securely, test early and often, and 
validate security. 
 
Compuware and Microsoft felt that if everyone was deploying anti-virus 
programs, firewalls, intrusion detection systems, then the weakest link had 
to be the application.  They claim that with all these security measures in 
place, there should be no security breaches, but security breaches still 
occur based on commonly exploited attack mechanisms: SQL injections 
and buffer overflows [22].  These vulnerabilities in the software place the 
application in danger of being attacked once the information is made 
aware to the public.  Compuware and Microsoft called for software 
developers to take security measures during the design phase to mitigate 
these risks [22].    
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2.5 Relevant Standards 
There are numerous standards that are currently being referenced by 
organizations that use sensitive information.  Sections 2.5.1-2.5.3 provides 
a description of three standards that can affect the software requirements 
specifications.  As discussed later in this document, the software engineers 
developing the software requirements specifications must understand how 
the customer’s organization needs to handle the data for their organization 
as well as how to handle the development of the SRS.  For example, 
ISO/IEC 27001:2005 and NIST SP 800-100 both provide asset 
classification.  Assets, such as data, are defined in the organizations 
information security management policies.  These policies also provide 
specifics on how the data is to be handled.  The software requirements 
specifications need to reflect a software design that will conform to the 
handling of such data according to the organizations information security 
management policies. 
2.5.1 ISO/IEC 9001:2000  
ISO/IEC 9001 provides requirements for quality management.  It provides 
development companies an organized guidance to create a quality 
management system.  The goal of a quality management system is to 
provide the developing organization a set of steps to developing a project 
and measurable guidelines to ensure that the customer receives a high 
quality product [26].  Software engineering companies would use ISO/IEC 
9001 to provide a structure for developing software.  A specific stage in 
this process might include develop software requirements specifications 
using IEEE Standard 830. 
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ISO/IEC 9001:2000 addresses issues such as: how to control documents, 
how to control records, how to perform internal audits, how to control 
nonconforming products, how to take corrective actions, and how to take 
preventative actions.  All six of these categories, addressed by ISO/IEC 
9001:2000, provide the quality management controls needed to maintain 
the software requirements specifications.    
2.5.2 ISO/IEC 27001:2005 
Information Security Management Policies are becoming a common 
practice.  ISE/IEC 27001:2005 provides a template for developing an 
information security management system (ISMS).  Located in the 
framework of an ISMS are: risk assessment and treatment, security policy, 
organization of information security, asset management, human resources 
security, physical and environmental security, communications and 
operations management, access control, information system acquisition, 
development, and maintenance, information security incident 
management, business continuity management, and compliance [27].  The 
software requirements specifications need to include references to the 
information security management policies of an organization.  Located in 
the ISMS is detailed information about how assets are analyzed and 
protected inside the organization. 
2.5.3 NIST SP 800-100 
The NIST information security management standard contains the 
following aspects: information security management governance, system 
development life cycle, awareness and training, capital planning and 
investment control, interconnecting systems, performance measures, 
security planning, information technology contingency planning, risk 
management, certification, accreditation, and security awareness, security 
services and products acquisition, incident response, and configuration 
management.  All of these policies, once created within an organization, 
provide detailed instructions on certain business aspects are to be 
addressed [25].  For example, in the awareness and training policy, a set of 
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specific guidelines will be specified as to how the training of a new system 
or security policy will be conducted inside the organization.  In the risk 
management policy, an organization would specify specific risks that it 
feels could harm the organizations wellbeing.  An example of such risk 
would be the risk of an unauthorized release of sensitive information.  It 
would provide a classification of the risk and possible ways to mitigate the 
issue.  Knowing what an organization believes are risks, during the 
development of the software requirements specifications for the 
organizations software, is a benefit software engineers will need to exploit.  
The design of the new system can ensure that these risks are either 
mitigated or eliminated. 
3 SECURING SENSITIVE INFORMATION 
Software engineers and computer scientists have progressively changed 
their focus when creating new software.  When software was first being 
written it was focused on scientific and mathematical problems that could 
be solved more easily by a computer than by hand.  Machine code was 
very tedious and difficult to write, with respect to today’s programming 
languages.  The focus during the beginning of computer programming was 
ensuring that the program completed the task accurately.  Once accuracy 
was achieved, programmers began focusing on making their code more 
efficient due to insufficient hardware resources, due to cost.  When the 
cost of hardware became low, programmers focused on developing large 
scale systems to make the lives of humans easier by automating tasks that 
would generally be tedious to users.  Now that computers are so widely 
used throughout humans’ lives, a new aspect of computer software has 
come into the light.  This aspect is security. 
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3.1 The Need for Secure Data   
On March 29, 2007, The Boston Globe reported that TJX had reported that 
45.7 million credit and debit card numbers were stolen during a security 
breach [18].  This is the largest security breach publicly recorded.  This 
security breach has already cost TJX over $5 million, and the cost is 
expected to continually rise.  With a cost estimated at $90 per record 
stolen, the potential expense that TJX will have to spend estimates at 
nearly $4.1 billion dollars [19]. 
 
On April 7, 2007, NetworkWorld reported that the Chicago Public School 
system had issued a bulletin stating that two laptops had been stolen from 
their organization.  Contained on the two laptops was nearly 40 thousand 
current and past employees’ personally identifiable information.  The 
information compromised in this case was names and social security 
numbers.  A $10 thousand dollar reward has been offered for the arrest 
and conviction of the felon who stole the information [20].  At the same 
$90 per record stolen, the potential expense that the Chicago Public 
School system may have to spend to resolve the issue is approximately 
$3.6 million dollars [19]. 
 
Darwin Professional Underwriters performed a research study based on 
news reports and survey groups to provide corporations with a calculator 
to estimate the possible cost of a security breach.  Darwin’s calculator 
estimates approximately $166.20 per record breached.  The costs 
calculated into the overall cost includes: internal investigation, 
notification/crisis management, and regulatory/compliance.  Figure 5 
provides a graphical representation based on Darwin’s calculator [21]. 
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Figure 5: Cost of a Security Breach [21]  
3.2 Digital Information and the Internet 
Digital information being stored and transmitted throughout the world, via 
the Internet, includes items such as: medical information, credit card 
numbers, social security numbers, and recently, biometric information.  As 
computer users become more accustomed to the digital world, more and 
more personal information will be stored in databanks of financial 
institutions, academic institutions, private organizations, governments, and 
corporations.  During the creation of the Internet, security was not a high 
concern, for the only groups that had access to it were trusted government 
and educational entities.  When the Internet became public domain and 
began to be used for commercial purposes, the need for security began to 
rise.  The more persons that have access to a resource the less secure it 
becomes.  Predators, thieves, and other criminals begin to find ways to 
exploit the new technology resources to advance their causes.   
 
Computer software is not only a desktop application, which initial 
computer users were accustomed, but also a means by which to share 
information through large, multiregional corporations and entities, via the 
Internet.   
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Consumers trust their financial institutions to keep the personal 
information provided to them private, but if the institution is sending 
information across the Internet, is the information protected?  During the 
software design process, if the requirements specifications for the software 
were to encrypt the data, then yes, but what if the specific security 
measures that needed to be put into place were not understood by 
developers? 
3.3 IEEE Standard 830 Analysis 
IEEE Standard 830 provides a template that is suggested to software 
engineers and computer scientists for use when developing software.  The 
standard provides a location in the template to describe the security with 
which the system needs to comply.  Even this standard has taken the 
afterthought approach to security.  A generic description of the security 
requirements can easily be misinterpreted.  Note that the standard does not 
insist that development organizations provide reasoning for the security of 
the system.    
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3.3.1 IEEE Standard 830 Security Analysis 
United States’ legislation is currently challenging the information 
technology profession to ensure that personal information is protected.  By 
modifying the IEEE Standard 830 to include a section called security 
requirements, software engineers and computer scientists could obtain a 
better understanding of what security measures need taken in the software 
they are developing.  What should the security requirements section 
contain?  The security requirements section should begin by specifying 
factors that “protect the software from accidental and malicious access, 
use, modification, destruction, or disclosure” [13].  Notice that this is 
exactly what the IEEE Standard 830 insists is in the general security 
section that it provides.  Following this description, it should provide a list 
of legislation, regulations, policies, or standards that could affect the 
corporation if the organization would experience an incident while using 
the software.  Along with each piece of legislation, regulation, policy, or 
standard, a description of the statute or regulatory rule should be 
described.  This section may need to be completed in conjunction with 
legal staff for either the developing company or the customer requesting 
the software.  Another addition to the security section includes the 
organization’s classification of their digital information and the specific 
requirements with which each classification must comply.   
 
The legislation, regulations, policies, or standards should be provided by 
the organization requesting the software, for these organizations have a 
better understanding as to what regulations by which they have to abide.  
Software engineers should work with the requesting organization to ensure 
that all the details of these regulatory statutes are understood. 
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Another addition to the standard to help developers grasp a better 
understanding requires how the digital information should be handled is to 
be completed by placing a security section in each function description.  
This security section would list the following items: how the digital 
information the function is processing is classified inside the organization, 
how the information should be handled, and a reference to any regulatory 
standards that could affect the processing, storage, or transmission of such 
data – in the newly created security section of the software requirements 
specifications.  
 
By providing this information to the developers of new software systems, 
developers have all the knowledge they need to complete a sound design, 
rather than adding patches to fix the problem after the software has been 
released.  
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3.3.2 Recommended Additions to IEEE Standard 830 
Sections 3.3.2.1 and 3.3.2.2 show the recommended additions the standard 
with descriptions of what each section specifies. 
3.3.2.1 SRS: Security Requirements Section 
3.1. Security Requirements 
It should be used to specify compliance regulations and policies as well 
as define the organizations data classification.   
3.1.1. Data Classifications 
This is a suggested addition to the standard.  It would include 
information based on the requesting organizations data 
classifications based on their information security policies. 
3.1.1.1. Classification Levels 
This would define the levels of classifications and what actions 
must be performed to protect the data section.  This will help 
the development team to accurately manage the digital 
information in the software. 
3.1.2. Compliance Regulations 
This is a suggested addition to the standard.  This section provides 
and overall view of what regulations or policies the software must 
conform. 
3.1.2.1. Regulation Name 
This would be the actual name of the regulation. 
3.1.2.1.1. Reference to Regulation 
This section would provide information for researching the 
regulation. 
3.1.2.1.2. Regulation Description 
This section would provide a detailed description of the 
aspects of the regulation or policy that could affect the 
software design. 
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3.3.2.2 SRS: Security Section 
3.1.1.8. Security 
This section will be used to provide information to the 
developer about the handling of the data based on above 
suggested addition to the standard. 
3.1.1.8.1. Regulatory Statutes 
This section states the statute that could affect the design of 
the function. 
3.1.1.8.2. Data Classification 
This section states the classification of the data being 
handled by the function. 
3.1.1.8.3. Data Handling 
This section specifies the specific means to manipulate the 
data during processing to abide by the regulatory statute. 
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3.4 Sample Security Elicitation Questions 
There are many different ways to elicit security requirements.  One 
possible way, if using the unified modeling language, is by taking the use 
case diagrams developed during the specifying of the functional 
requirements of the system and changing them into misuse case diagrams.  
To do this, the diagrams are used to display what a user would not want to 
occur during the scenario being documented.  Below is a set of example 
security elicitation questions that will help developers gain an 
understanding of the current security needs of their customer. 
 Does your organization have to comply with any specific 
regulations or corporate policies? 
 Would you provide us with a copy of these regulations or 
corporate policies? 
 Do you currently have an information security management 
policy? 
 If so, what data is classified inside your organization? 
 How is this data classified? 
 Are there any specific requirements for how the data shall be 
handled (for example: storage, transmission, processing, et cetera)? 
 What security measures do you currently employ in your 
organization? 
 Do you know or have a recommendation for the types of security 
that shall be used throughout the design of the new system? 
 Do you currently own a VeriSign Certificate, or any other digital 
certificates? 
 What business practices need to involve security? 
 What aspects of the system being designed do you foresee needing 
security? 
 How are you currently implementing user access controls? 
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3.5 Sample Requirements Elicitation 
For instance: Developers are informed by their customer that they need to 
be able to process credit cards in their software.  The customer also states 
that they need the ability to store the credit card information for future 
purchases of their customers.  The developer would ask the following set 
of questions to correctly specify the functionality of the software: Are 
there any specific legislation, regulations or corporate policies pertaining 
to how credit card information is handled?  The customer would then 
reply, yes, our organization has to comply with the Payment Card Industry 
Data Security Standard, also known as the PCIDSS.  For the purpose of 
this example, it is assumed that this is the only regulatory statute with 
which the organization needs to comply.  The developer would then ask, 
assuming that the developer already understands the organization’s digital 
information classification and the requirements it must meet, how is the 
credit card information classified?  The organization representative 
replies, the information is classified as red – the highest level of 
classification in the organization.  The developer then asks, are there any 
specific ways that this information has to be handled?  The organization 
representative then replies, it must be encrypted at all times possible and 
the complete number should never be displayed to any personnel within 
our organization. 
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3.5.1 Sample Security Requirements 
The software requirements specifications security section would appear as 
follows: 
 
<<ALL OTHER SPECIFICATIONS FROM SECTION 6.1>> 
3.1 Security Requirements: 
 <<ALL TEMPLATE FIELDS FROM SECTION 6.1>> 
 0 Data Classifications 
0 Red: Highest level of classification.  This data should be 
encrypted using X standard.  This classification 
holds information including: credit card 
information, <<ALL OTHER INFORMATION IN 
THIS CLASSIFICATION>>.   
<<ALL OTHER DATA CLASSIFICATIONS>>   
3.1.2 Compliance Regulations: 
3.1.2.1 Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard, 
PCIDSS 
3.1.2.1.1 Reference to Regulation: See reference 
1.1.1 in the references section.   
3.1.2.1.2 Description: PCIDSS is a regulatory 
statute placed on organizations and 
corporations that accept credit cards as a 
form of payment.  It states that when 
displaying credit card numbers either on 
printed receipts or on the organizations user 
displays that only one of the following three 
items can be displayed: the first four 
numbers, the last four numbers, or both. 
    <<ALL OTHER COMPLIACE REGULATIONS>> 
 <<ALL OTHER SPECIFICATIONS FROM SECTION 6.1>> 
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3.5.2 Sample Function Specification 
The software requirements specification for the previously mentioned 
example would appear as follows: 
 
<<ALL OTHER SPECIFICATIONS FROM SECTION 6.1>> 
3.3.1 FUNCTION X Specification 
<<ALL TEMPLATE FIELDS FROM SECTION 6.1 >> 
  3.3.1.8 Security 
3.3.1.8.1 Regulatory Statutes: PCIDSS further defined in 
section X.X 
   3.3.1.8.2 Data Classifications: Credit Card Number – Red 
3.3.1.8.3 Data Handling: The credit card number should not 
be displayed to anyone in the organization.  After 
Credit Card number is read into the system encrypt 
the information and store it into a masked field in 
the database.  Ensure that the hard drive the 
information is stored on is encrypted using X 
standard. 
 <<ALL OTHER SPECIFICATIONS FROM SECTION 6.1>>   
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3.6 Technique for Specification of Data 
ISO/IEC 11179-1 is a standard that is used to specify information about 
data (metadata) [23].  This specification of the metadata is to be stored in a 
metadata registry (MDR).  The purpose of the standard is to specify data 
so that it can be shared in a standard way across distributed or large scale 
systems.  By using ISO/IEC 11179-1, software engineers can ensure that 
the data is being represented by a specific set of rules [23].  
 
The data elements are classified by placing them in a conceptual domain.  
A conceptual domain is further divided into a set of categories – 
representation of the meaning and permissible values [23].  By using the 
customers data classification based on their organizations information 
security management policies, software developers can specify the 
necessary information needed to utilize an MDR.  This information serves 
as a framework for what they data looks like and should be handled.  An 
example based on the previously mentioned scenario follows.       
3.6.1 Sample Classification of Data 
Conceptual Domain Name:   CreditCards 
Conceptual Domain Definition:  Has a set of digits between 13 and 16  
Conceptual Security Policy: Only the last 4 digits can be 
displayed in the system. 
------------------------------------------------------ 
Value Domain Name (1):  MasterCard 
Value Domain Description: Card prefix must be between 51-55 
and have a total of 16 digits     
Value Domain Name (2): Visa 
Value Domain Description: Card prefix must be 4 and have 
either 13 or 16 digits 
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3.7 IEEE Standard 830 and the Law 
Most of the state security breach laws list specifically that organizations 
and corporations must inform customers “…whose unencrypted personal 
information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an 
unauthorized person” [17].  If developers are aware of this clause in the 
state legislations, they could develop software that would automatically 
encrypt information prior to storage or transmission and decrypt it upon 
processing.  This would minimize the risk of disclosing personal 
information.  Taking extra measurers to ensure that the software is more 
secure will make the cost of the product more expensive – more 
requirements, more elicitation, more coding, and more bandwidth – but it 
will save the company from a long and involved legal battle, due to 
disclosure of information under a legislative regulation that requires the 
information secured.    
 
Section 6.1 shows the aforementioned recommended changes to the 
software requirements specifications outline.  
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4 CONCLUSION 
Securing information in software engineering projects is becoming 
increasingly necessary.  Many United States federal and state governments 
are enacting legislation to ensure that digital information provided to 
financial institutions is protected.    Corporations also have to set their own 
policies and standards to ensure information that they need to complete 
business is secure.  An excellent example is the previously mentioned 
PCIDSS.   
 
The corporations and governments that are regulating how digital 
information is handled are relying on the information technology 
professionals, including computer scientists and software engineers, to 
ensure that their regulations are upheld and audited.  As new software 
projects are defined and software requirements specifications are gathered, 
more emphasis needs placed on security throughout the design phase, 
rather than just at the end or from a very low level of security.   
 
This paper presented a proposed change to the software requirements 
specifications outline provided by IEEE Standard 830.  This change would 
help ensure that security is analyzed in an earlier stage of the software 
development lifecycle.  The new template will help the information 
technology industry to develop more secure and legally compliant 
software. 
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5 FUTURE WORK 
This document will be provided to the Secretary, IEEE-SA Standards 
Board, as a suggested change.  After this document is presented to the 
board, the board may make a decision to either: create a new standard, 
create a revision to the current standard, amend the current standard, 
correct any technical issues of the current standard, correct grammatical 
errors in the current standard, or do nothing.   
 
IEEE has set a specific set of guidelines that must be followed to invoke a 
change to a standard.  First, a project authorization request must be filed to 
the New Standards Committee (NesCom).  Once approved by NesCom a 
working group will be developed.  The working group is charged with the 
task of developing a draft.  After the draft is complete, the sponsor of the 
working group will ballot the draft standard.  If the ballot is successful, 
then the draft is sent to the IEEE Review Committee (RevCom).  RevCom 
will make a recommendation to the IEEE-SA Standards Board.  After the 
Standards Board has approved the new standard, it enters the manage 
phase.  The first step of the manage phase is to publish the standard.  Once 
published, it will be reviewed every five years for relevance [24].   
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6 APPENDICES 
6.1 APPENDIX A: Software Requirements Specifications  
The following is a suggested requirements specifications template.  The 
modified sections of the IEEE Standard 830-1998 are highlighted [13].  
There are many ways to organized section 3 of the template provided in 
IEEE Standard 830-1998 and they are located in section 6.2.   
 
1. Introduction 
This section provides an overview of the entire SRS 
1.1. Purpose 
This section specifies the intended audience and provides the purpose of 
the SRS 
1.2. Scope 
Identifies the software products being developed by name and provides a 
brief description as to what each of the products will or will not do.  This 
section also provides the benefits and objectives of the developing 
software. 
1.3. Definitions, Acronyms, and Abbreviations 
This section provides information that is needed to correctly interpret the 
SRS. 
1.4. References 
This section provides a list of all sources used to create the document or 
the citations for any documents that are referenced throughout the SRS. 
1.5. Overview 
Describes what the rest of the SRS contains.  Ensure that in this section 
a description of how the security information is presented in the SRS is 
described.   
2. Overall Description 
This section describes factors that affect the product or the SRS. 
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2.1. Product Perspective 
The product perspective relates the developing product to other products.  
It also specifies how the system operates inside various constraints. 
2.1.1. System Interfaces 
This section lists the system interfaces and the functionality of the 
software to accomplish the system requirement.   
2.1.2. User Interfaces 
This describes both the logical characteristics of each interface to 
the user and the aspects of optimizing the interface with the person 
who will be using the system. 
2.1.3. Hardware Interfaces 
This will provide protocols and supported devices for the developing 
system.  It also provides the configuration characteristics between 
the software and hardware. 
2.1.4. Software Interfaces 
This provides information on how the developing software will 
connect to other software products necessary.  Items needed to 
specify a software connection are: name, mnemonic, specification 
number, version number, and source.  A brief discussion should be 
provided as to the reasoning for the connection to the other software 
product.   
2.1.5. Communications Interfaces 
This provides information on the various communication protocols 
the developing software will interface. 
2.1.6. Memory 
This specifies the limits on primary and secondary memory. 
2.1.7. Operations 
This specifies the normal and special operations required by the 
user. 
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2.1.8. Site Adaptation Requirements 
This provides information on the environment and mission of the site 
where the software is being installed.  It would provide special 
requirements necessary for the specific location. 
2.2. Product Functions 
This provides a summary of the major functionality within the system.  
Textual and graphical methods to specifying the functionality of the 
software is encouraged. 
2.3. User Characteristics 
This provides a general description of the system users: technical 
expertise, education level, language, or experience. 
2.4. Constraints 
This includes information that would limit the developer’s options.  The 
following subheadings (Regulatory Policies2.4.1-2.4.11) are some 
possible constraints that may need considered. 
2.4.1. Regulatory Policies 
This describes corporate regulations that would limit the 
developer’s options. 
2.4.2. Hardware Limitations 
This provides descriptions of any hardware limitations. 
2.4.3. Interfaces to Other Applications 
This describes interfaces to commercial off the shelf systems as well 
as other previously developed systems. 
2.4.4. Parallel Operations 
This describes any required parallel operations the system may need 
to perform. 
2.4.5. Audit Functions 
This describes any required audit or monitoring function necessary. 
2.4.6. Control Functions 
This describes any specific control functions that could limit the 
developer’s options. 
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2.4.7. Higher-order Language Requirements 
This describes specific language constraints due to the language of 
the system. 
2.4.8. Signal Handshake Protocols 
For example: ACK-NACK or XON-XOFF. 
2.4.9. Reliability Requirements 
This describes any specific reliability requirements.   
2.4.10. Criticality of the Applications 
This describes the criticality of the system being developed. 
2.4.11. Safety and Security Considerations 
This provides an overview of any known safety or security issues that 
would need to be known during the development phase. 
2.5. Assumptions and Dependencies 
This provides a list of factors that affect the requirements stated in the 
SRS.  These are not design constraints but any changes to these items 
would inflict a necessary change to the SRS. 
2.6. Apportioning of Requirements 
This section identifies requirements that might be delayed for future 
versions or releases. 
3. Specific Requirements 
This section is to define the specific technical details of the system so that 
designers can develop the product and testers can test the product. 
3.1. Security Requirements 
It should be used to specify compliance regulations and policies as well 
as define the organizations data classification.  This section provides 
overall security requirements for the system.  Sections 3.1.3-0 are some 
recommended evaluated areas, there are many others that could be 
listed in this section.   
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3.1.1. Data Classifications 
This is a suggested addition to the standard.  It would include 
information based on the requesting organizations data 
classifications based on their information security policies. 
3.1.1.1. Classification Levels 
This would define the levels of classifications and what 
actions must be performed to protect the data section.  This 
will help the development team to accurately manage the 
digital information in the software. 
3.1.2. Compliance Regulations 
This is a suggested addition to the standard.  This section provides 
and overall view of what regulations or policies the software must 
conform.   
3.1.2.1. Regulation Name 
This would be the actual name of the regulation. 
3.1.2.1.1. Reference to Regulation 
This section would provide information for researching 
the regulation. 
3.1.2.1.2. Regulation Description 
This section would provide a detailed description of the 
aspects of the regulation or policy that could affect the 
software design. 
3.1.3. Utilize Certain Cryptographical Techniques 
This section would provide the specific technique or encryption 
standard to be utilized during development. 
3.1.4. Keep Specific Log or History Data Sets 
This section would specify what information needs log and the 
length of the logs (space or time). 
3.1.5. Assign Certain Functions to Different Modules 
This section would separate the functions into groups based on 
security level or access level. 
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3.1.6. Restrict Communications between some Areas of the Program 
This section would state where communication paths should be 
restricted. 
3.1.7. Check Data Integrity for Critical Values 
This would specify algorithm to be used to compute checksums and 
what aspects need checksums. 
3.2. External Interfaces 
This section provides a detailed description of all inputs into and outputs 
from the system.  Section 3.2.1 provides a breakdown as to specifying the 
data inputs/outputs. 
3.2.1. Name of Item 
This contains the name of the input/output. 
3.2.1.1. Description of Purpose 
This section would describe why the input/output is needed. 
3.2.1.2. Source of Input or Destination of Output 
This section would state where the input is coming or where the 
output is going. 
3.2.1.3. Valid Range, Accuracy, and/or Tolerance 
This section would set threshold values of the input/output. 
3.2.1.4. Units of Measure 
This would specify what units the input/output is in. 
3.2.1.5. Timing 
This would set threshold value for the length of time to receive 
the input or provide the output. 
3.2.1.6. Relationships to other inputs/outputs 
This would describe how it interacts with other inputs/outputs. 
3.2.1.7. Screen Formats/Organization 
This section is to describe how the screen should be organized. 
3.2.1.8. Window Formats/Organization 
This section is to describe how the window should be organized. 
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3.2.1.9. Data Formats 
This section defines the format or type of the input. 
3.2.1.10. Command Formats 
This section defines how the information is received/provided. 
3.2.1.11. End Messages 
This section defines the final state or message after processing 
the data. 
3.3. Functions 
This section is used to specify the functions in the software product. 
3.3.1. Function Name 
This section specifically states the function name as it would appear 
in the code. 
3.3.1.1. Validity Checks on the Inputs 
This section states what checks shall be performed on all inputs 
into the function. 
3.3.1.2. Exact Sequence of Operations 
This section defines the steps of the function. 
3.3.1.3. Responses to Abnormal Situations 
This section defines how the system should handle abnormal 
conditions.  Sections 3.3.1.3.1-3.3.1.3.3 are some recommended 
conditions to evaluate; there are many others that could be 
added to this section. 
3.3.1.3.1. Overflow 
This section states how the system should handle an overflow 
issue. 
3.3.1.3.2. Communication Facilities 
This section states how the system should handle 
communication faults. 
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3.3.1.3.3. Error Handling and Recovery 
This section describes specific error conditions and how the 
system should recover.  These will be specific to each system. 
3.3.1.4. Effect of Parameters 
This section should specify what each parameter’s purpose is in 
the function. 
3.3.1.5. Relationship of Outputs to Inputs 
This section is used to show how the information is converted 
from an input to an output. 
3.3.1.6. Input/output Sequences 
Provides the sequences by which to receive or produce an 
input/output. 
3.3.1.7. Formulas for Input to Output conversion 
This section provides specific formulas for converting the input 
to an output. 
3.3.1.8. Security 
This section will be used to provide information to the 
developer about the handling of the data based on above 
suggested addition to the standard. 
3.3.1.8.1. Regulatory Statutes 
This section states the statute that could affect the design 
of the function. 
3.3.1.8.2. Data Classification 
This section states the classification of the data being 
handled by the function. 
3.3.1.8.3. Data Handling 
This section specifies the specific means to manipulate the 
data during processing to abide by the regulatory statute. 
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3.4. Performance Requirements 
This section is used to provide performance requirements to the 
developer during the coding phase.  It provides numerical requirements 
placed on the software or on human interaction with the software as a 
whole. 
3.4.1. Static Numerical Requirements 
These are values that are set that should not change. 
3.4.1.1. Number of Terminals to be Supported 
This section provides the number of terminals that the software 
will operate on. 
3.4.1.2. Number of Simultaneous Users to be Supported 
This section provides the number of users the system should be 
able to support. 
3.4.1.3. Amount and Type of Information to be Handled 
This section provides information on the amount of information 
and the type of information that the system will be processing. 
3.4.2. Dynamic Numerical Requirements 
These are values that are based on threshold values or a function of 
time. 
3.4.2.1. Number of Transactions to be Processed in a Given Time 
Period 
This provides the number of transaction to be processed and the 
time they have to be processed in. 
3.5. Logical Database Requirements 
This section provides the requirements of anything to be placed or access 
a database.  Sections 3.5.1-3.5.6 are some suggested areas to consider 
when specifying database requirements. 
3.5.1. Types of Information used by Various Functions 
This section specifies the types of data being used. 
3.5.2. Frequency of Use 
This specifies how frequently the database will be used. 
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3.5.3. Accessing Capabilities 
This specifies how the functions will access the database. 
3.5.4. Data Entities and their Relationships 
This specifies what entities are located in the database and how they 
are related to each other. 
3.5.5. Integrity Constraints 
This sets the requirements on how the database verifies that the 
information is correct. 
3.5.6. Data Retention Requirements 
This specifies how long the data is to be kept. 
3.6. Standards Compliance 
This section specifies the developer’s standards for developing the 
software.  This is specified to ensure consistency. 
3.6.1. Report Format 
This specifies how the developers will provide reports to the 
customers and what is to be located in them. 
3.6.2. Data Naming 
This section specifies the standard by which information is named in 
the source code. 
3.6.3. Accounting Procedures 
This section specifies how functions will call each other. 
3.6.4. Audit Tracing 
This specifies how to trace processes that have occurred in the 
system. 
3.7. Software System Attributes 
These are requirements that have not been elsewhere documented that the 
system must conform.  Sections 3.7.1-3.7.5 provides a list of suggested 
areas to evaluate.  There are many other evaluation methods that could 
be listed in this section. 
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3.7.1. Reliability 
This section specifies how reliable the software must be at the time of 
delivery. 
3.7.2. Availability 
Specifies when the system should be available.  It can analyze 
checkpoints, recoveries, and restarts. 
3.7.3. Security 
This section provides overall security requirements for the system.  
Sections 0-3.7.3.5 are some recommended evaluated areas, there 
are many others that could be listed in this section. 
3.7.3.1. Utilize Certain Cryptographical Techniques 
This section would provide the specific technique or 
encryption standard to be utilized during development. 
3.7.3.2. Keep Specific Log or History Data Sets 
This section would specify what information needs log and the 
length of the logs (space or time). 
3.7.3.3. Assign Certain Functions to Different Modules 
This section would separate the functions into groups based 
on security level or access level. 
3.7.3.4. Restrict Communications between some Areas of the 
Program 
This section would state where communication paths should 
be restricted. 
3.7.3.5. Check Data Integrity for Critical Values 
This would specify algorithm to be used to compute 
checksums and what aspects need checksums. 
3.7.4. Maintainability 
This specifies requirements that relate to the ease of maintenance.  
There may be some requirement for certain modularity, interfaces, 
complexity, et cetera. 
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3.7.5. Portability 
This section defines how portable the system must or should be. 
3.7.5.1. Percentage of Components with Host-dependent Code 
This is a threshold percentage based on total components. 
3.7.5.2. Percentage of code that is host dependent 
This is a threshold value based on all of the system code. 
3.7.5.3. Use of a Proven Portable Language 
This section specifies the use of a particular language that the 
code is to be written in. 
3.7.5.4. Use of a Particular Compiler or Language Subset 
This section specifies the use of a particular compiler for the 
code. 
3.7.5.5. Use of a Particular Operating System 
This section specifies what operating systems the software 
should be able to operate on.  
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6.2 APPENDIX B: SRS Section 3 Templates 
All of the following templates have been modified based on the templates 
located in IEEE Standard 830-1998 [13]. 
6.2.1 Organized by Mode [13] 
3.  Specific Requirements 
 3.1. External Interface Requirements 
  3.1.1. User Interfaces 
  3.2.1. Hardware Interfaces 
  3.3.1. Software Interfaces 
  3.4.1. Communications Interfaces 
 3.2. Security Requirements 
  3.2.1. Data Classifications 
   3.2.1.1. Classification Levels 
  3.2.2. Compliance Regulations 
   3.2.2.1. Regulation Name 
    3.2.2.1.1. Reference to Regulation 
    3.2.2.1.2. Regulation Description 
  3.2.3. Other Security Requirements     
 3.3. Functional Requirements 
  3.3.1. Mode 1 
   3.3.1.1. Functional Requirement 1.1 
    . 
    . 
    . 
3.3.1.1.x. Security 
      3.3.1.1.x.1. Regulatory Statutes 
     3.3.1.1.x.2. Data Classification 
     3.3.1.1.x.3. Data Handling 
   . 
   . 
   . 
   3.3.1.n. Functional Requirement 1.n 
    . 
    . 
    . 
3.3.1.n.x. Security 
      3.3.1.n.x.1. Regulatory Statutes 
     3.3.1.n.x.2. Data Classification 
     3.3.1.n.x.3. Data Handling 
  3.3.2. Mode 2 
  . 
  . 
  . 
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3.3.m. Mode m 
   3.3.m.1. Functional Requirement m.1 
    . 
    . 
    . 
3.3.m.1.x. Security 
      3.3.m.1.x.1. Regulatory Statutes 
     3.3.m.1.x.2. Data Classification 
     3.3.m.1.x.3. Data Handling 
   . 
   . 
   . 
   3.3.m.n. Functional Requirement m.n 
. 
. 
. 
3.3.m.n.x. Security 
      3.3.m.n.x.1. Regulatory Statutes 
     3.3.m.n.x.2. Data Classification 
     3.3.m.n.x.3. Data Handling 
 3.4. Performance Requirements 
 3.5. Design Constraints 
 3.6. Software System Attributes 
 3.7. Other Requirements 
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6.2.2 Organized by Mode: Version 2 [13] 
3. Specific Requirements 
 3.1. Functional Requirements 
  3.1.1. Mode 1 
   3.1.1.1. External Interfaces 
    3.1.1.1.1. User Interfaces 
    3.1.1.1.2. Hardware Interfaces 
    3.1.1.1.3. Software Interfaces 
    3.1.1.1.4. Communications Interfaces 
 3.1.1.2. Security Requirements 
  3.1.1.2.1. Data Classifications 
   3.1.1.2.1.1. Classification Levels 
  3.1.1.2.2. Compliance Regulations 
   3.1.1.2.2.2. Regulation Name 
3.1.1.2.2.2.1.  Reference to Regulation 
3.1.1.2.2.2.2. Regulation Description 
  3.1.1.2.3. Other Security Requirements  
   3.1.1.3 Functional Requirements 
    3.1.1.3.1. Functional Requirement 1 
    . 
    . 
    . 
3.1.1.3.1.x. Security 
      3.1.1.3.1.x.1. Regulatory Statutes 
     3.1.1.3.1.x.2. Data Classification 
     3.1.1.3.1.x.3. Data Handling 
. 
    . 
    . 
    3.1.1.3.n. Functional Requirement n 
    . 
    . 
    . 
3.1.1.3.1.x. Security 
      3.1.1.3.1.x.1. Regulatory Statutes 
     3.1.1.3.1.x.2. Data Classification 
     3.1.1.3.1.x.3. Data Handling 
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3.1.1.4 Performance 
3.1.2. Mode 2 
  . 
  . 
  . 
  3.1.m. Mode m 
 3.2 Design Constraints 
 3.3 Software System Attributes 
 3.4 Other Requirements 
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6.2.3 Organized by User Class [13] 
3. Specific Requirements 
 3.1. External Interface Requirements 
  3.1.1. User Interfaces 
  3.1.2. Hardware Interfaces 
  3.1.3. Software Interfaces 
  3.1.4. Communications Interfaces 
 3.2. Security Requirements 
  3.2.1. Data Classifications 
   3.2.1.1. Classification Levels 
  3.2.2. Compliance Regulations 
   3.2.2.1. Regulation Name 
    3.2.2.1.1. Reference to Regulation 
    3.2.2.1.2. Regulation Description 
  3.2.3. Other Security Requirements     
 3.3. Functional Requirements 
  3.3.1. User Class 1 
   3.3.1.1. Functional Requirement 1.1 
    . 
    . 
    . 
3.3.1.1.x. Security 
      3.3.1.1.x.1. Regulatory Statutes 
     3.3.1.1.x.2. Data Classification 
     3.3.1.1.x.3. Data Handling 
   . 
   . 
   . 
   3.3.1.n Functional Requirement 1.n 
    . 
    . 
    . 
3.3.1.n.x. Security 
      3.3.1.n.x.1. Regulatory Statutes 
     3.3.1.n.x.2. Data Classification 
     3.3.1.n.x.3. Data Handling 
  3.3.2. User Class 2 
  . 
  . 
  . 
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3.3.m. User Class m 
   3.3.m.1. Functional Requirement m.1 
    . 
    . 
    . 
3.3.m.1.x. Security 
      3.3.m.1.x.1. Regulatory Statutes 
     3.3.m.1.x.2. Data Classification 
     3.3.m.1.x.3. Data Handling 
   . 
   . 
   . 
   3.3.m.n. Functional Requirement m.n 
. 
. 
. 
3.3.m.n.x. Security 
      3.3.m.n.x.1. Regulatory Statutes 
     3.3.m.n.x.2. Data Classification 
     3.3.m.n.x.3. Data Handling 
 3.4. Performance Requirements 
 3.5. Design Constraints 
 3.6. Software System Attributes 
 3.7. Other Requirements  
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6.2.4 Organized by Object [13] 
3. Specific Requirements 
 3.1. External Interface Requirements 
  3.1.1. User Interfaces 
  3.1.2. Hardware Interfaces 
  3.1.3. Software Interfaces 
  3.1.4. Communications Interfaces 
 3.2. Security Requirements 
  3.2.1. Data Classifications 
   3.2.1.1. Classification Levels 
  3.2.2. Compliance Regulations 
   3.2.2.1. Regulation Name 
    3.2.2.1.1. Reference to Regulation 
    3.2.2.1.2. Regulation Description 
  3.2.3. Other Security Requirements     
 3.3. Classes/Objects 
  3.3.1. Class/Object 1 
   3.3.1.1. Attributes (direct or inherited) 
    3.3.1.1.1. Attribute 1 
     . 
     . 
     . 
     3.3.1.1.1.x. Data Classification 
. 
    . 
    . 
    3.3.1.1.n. Attribute n 
     . 
     . 
     . 
     3.3.1.1.n.x. Data Classification 
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3.3.1.2. Functions (services, methods, direct or inherieted) 
    3.3.1.2.1. Functional Requirement 1.1 
    . 
    . 
    . 
    3.3.1.2.1.x. Data Handling 
    . 
    . 
    . 
    3.3.1.2.m. Functional Requirement 1.m 
    . 
    . 
    . 
    3.3.1.2.m.x. Data Handling 
   3.3.1.3. Messages (communications received or sent) 
   . 
   . 
   . 
3.3.1.3.x. Regulatory Statutes 
  3.3.2. Class/Object p 
  . 
  . 
  . 
  3.3.p. Class/Object p 
 3.4. Performance Requirements 
 3.5. Design Constraints 
 3.6. Software System Attributes 
 3.7. Other Requirements 
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6.2.5 Organized by Feature [13] 
3. Specific Requirements 
 3.1. External Interface Requirements 
  3.1.1. User Interfaces 
  3.1.2. Hardware Interfaces 
  3.1.3. Software Interfaces 
  3.1.4. Communications Interfaces 
 3.2. Security Requirements 
  3.2.1. Data Classifications 
   3.2.1.1. Classification Levels 
  3.2.2. Compliance Regulations 
   3.2.2.1. Regulation Name 
    3.2.2.1.1. Reference to Regulation 
    3.2.2.1.2. Regulation Description 
  3.2.3. Other Security Requirements     
3.3. System Features 
  3.3.1. System Feature 1 
   3.3.1.1. Introduction/Purpose of feature 
   3.3.1.2. Stimulus/Response sequence 
   3.3.1.3. Associated Functional Requirements 
    3.3.1.3.1. Functional Requirement 1 
    . 
    . 
    . 
3.3.1.3.1.x. Security 
      3.3.1.3.1.x.1. Regulatory Statutes 
     3.3.1.3.1.x.2. Data Classification 
     3.3.1.3.1.x.3. Data Handling 
    . 
    . 
    . 
    3.3.1.3.n. Functional Requirement n 
    . 
    . 
    . 
3.3.1.3.n.x. Security 
      3.3.1.3.n.x.1. Regulatory Statutes 
     3.3.1.3.n.x.2. Data Classification 
     3.3.1.3.n.x.3. Data Handling 
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3.3.2. System Feature 2 
  . 
  . 
  . 
  3.3.m. System Feature m 
  . 
  . 
  . 
 3.4. Performance Requirements 
 3.5. Design Constraints 
 3.6. Software System Attributes 
 3.7. Other Requirements 
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6.2.6 Organized by Stimulus [13] 
3. Specific Requirements 
 3.1 External Interfaces 
  3.1.1. User Interfaces 
  3.1.2. Hardware Interfaces 
  3.1.3. Software Interfaces 
  3.1.4. Communications Interfaces 
 3.2. Security Requirements 
  3.2.1. Data Classifications 
   3.2.1.1. Classification Levels 
  3.2.2. Compliance Regulations 
   3.2.2.1. Regulation Name 
    3.2.2.1.1. Reference to Regulation 
    3.2.2.1.2. Regulation Description 
  3.2.3. Other Security Requirements     
 3.3. Functional Requirements 
  3.3.1. Stimulus 1 
   3.3.1.1. Functional Requirement 1.1 
    . 
    . 
    . 
3.3.1.1.x. Security 
      3.3.1.1.x.1. Regulatory Statutes 
     3.3.1.1.x.2. Data Classification 
     3.3.1.1.x.3. Data Handling 
   . 
   . 
   . 
   3.3.1.n. Functional Requirement 1.n 
    . 
    . 
    . 
3.3.1.n.x. Security 
      3.3.1.n.x.1. Regulatory Statutes 
     3.3.1.n.x.2. Data Classification 
     3.3.1.n.x.3. Data Handling 
  3.3.2. Stimulus 2 
  . 
  . 
  . 
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3.3.m. Stimulus m 
   3.3.m.1. Functional Requirement m.1 
    . 
    . 
    . 
3.3.m.1.x. Security 
      3.3.m.1.x.1. Regulatory Statutes 
     3.3.m.1.x.2. Data Classification 
     3.3.m.1.x.3. Data Handling 
   . 
   . 
   . 
   3.3.m.n. Functional Requirement m.n 
    . 
    . 
    . 
3.3.m.n.x. Security 
      3.3.m.n.x.1. Regulatory Statutes 
     3.3.m.n.x.2. Data Classification 
     3.3.m.n.x.3. Data Handling 
 3.4. Performance Requirements 
 3.5. Design Constraints 
 3.6. Software System Attributes 
 3.7. Other Requirements 
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6.2.7 Organized by Functional Hierarchy [13] 
3. Specific Requirements 
 3.1. External Interface Requirements 
  3.1.1. User Interfaces 
  3.1.2. Hardware Interfaces 
  3.1.3. Software Interfaces 
  3.1.4. Communications Interfaces 
 3.2. Security Requirements 
  3.2.1. Data Classifications 
   3.2.1.1. Classification Levels 
  3.2.2. Compliance Regulations 
   3.2.2.1. Regulation Name 
    3.2.2.1.1. Reference to Regulation 
    3.2.2.1.2. Regulation Description 
  3.2.3. Other Security Requirements     
 3.3. Functional Requirements 
  3.3.1. Information Flows 
   3.3.1.1. Data Flow Diagram 1 
    3.3.1.1.1. Data Entities 
    3.3.1.1.2. Pertinent Processes 
    3.3.1.1.3. Topology 
   3.3.1.2. Data Flow Diagram 2 
   . 
   . 
   . 
   3.3.1.n. Data Flow Diagram n 
    3.2.1.n.1. Data Entities 
    3.2.1.n.2. Pertinent Processes 
    3.2.1.n.3. Topology 
  3.3.2. Process Descriptions 
   3.3.2.1. Process 1 
    3.3.2.1.1. Input Data Entities 
    3.3.2.1.2. Algorithm or Formula of Process 
      3.3.2.1.2.1. Regulatory Statutes 
     3.3.2.1.2.2. Data Handling 
    3.3.2.1.3. Affected Data Entities 
3.3.2.2. Process 2 
    3.3.2.2.1. Input Data Entities 
    3.3.2.2.2. Algorithm or Formula of Process 
      3.3.2.2.2.1. Regulatory Statutes 
     3.3.2.2.2.2. Data Handling 
    3.3.2.2.3. Affected Data Entities 
   . 
   . 
   .    
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3.3.2.m. Process m 
    3.3.2.m.1. Input Data Entities 
    3.3.2.m.2. Algorithm or Formula of Process 
      3.3.2.m.2.1. Regulatory Statutes 
     3.3.2.m.2.2. Data Handling 
    3.3.2.m.3. Affected Data Entities 
3.3.3. Data Construct Specifications 
   3.3.3.1. Construct 1 
    3.3.3.1.1. Record Type 
    3.3.3.1.2. Constituent Fields 
   3.3.3.2. Construct 2 
    3.3.3.2.1. Record Type 
    3.3.3.2.2. Constituent Fields 
   . 
   . 
   . 
   3.3.3.p. Construct p 
    3.3.3.p.1. Record Type 
    3.3.3.p.2. Constituent Fields 
  3.3.4. Data Dictionary 
   3.3.4.1. Data Element 1 
    3.3.4.1.1. Name 
    3.3.4.1.2. Representation 
    3.3.4.1.3. Units/Format 
    3.3.4.1.4. Precision/Accuracy 
    3.3.4.1.5. Range 
    3.3.4.1.6. Data Classification  
   3.3.4.2. Data Element 2 
    3.3.4.2.1. Name 
    3.3.4.2.2. Representation 
    3.3.4.2.3. Units/Format 
    3.3.4.2.4. Precision/Accuracy 
    3.3.4.2.5. Range 
    3.3.4.2.6. Data Classification  
   . 
   . 
   . 
   3.3.4.q. Data Element q 
    3.3.4.q.1. Name 
    3.3.4.q.2. Representation 
    3.3.4.q.3. Units/Format 
    3.3.4.q.4. Precision/Accuracy 
    3.3.4.q.5. Range 
    3.3.4.q.6. Data Classification  
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3.4. Performance Requirements 
 3.5. Design Constraints 
 3.6. Software System Attributes 
 3.7. Other Requirements 
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6.2.8 Showing Multiple Organizations [13] 
3. Specific Requirements 
 3.1. External Interfaces 
  3.1.1. User Interfaces 
  3.1.2. Hardware Interfaces 
  3.1.3. Software Interfaces 
  3.1.4. Communications Interfaces 
 3.2. Security Requirements 
  3.2.1. Data Classifications 
   3.2.1.1. Classification Levels 
  3.2.2. Compliance Regulations 
   3.2.2.1. Regulation Name 
    3.2.2.1.1. Reference to Regulation 
    3.2.2.1.2. Regulation Description 
  3.2.3. Other Security Requirements     
 3.3. Functional Requirements 
  3.3.1. User Class 1 
   3.3.1.1. Feature 1.1 
    3.3.1.1.1. Introduction/Purpose of Feature 
    3.3.1.1.2. Stimulus/Response Sequence 
    3.3.1.1.3. Associated Functional Requirements 
    . 
    . 
    . 
3.3.1.1.3.x. Security 
      3.3.1.1.3.x.1. Regulatory Statutes 
     3.3.1.1.3.x.2. Data Classification 
     3.3.1.1.3.x.3. Data Handling 
   3.3.1.2. Feature 1.2 
    3.3.1.2.1. Introduction/Purpose of Feature 
    3.3.1.2.2. Stimulus/Response Sequence 
    3.3.1.2.3. Associated Functional Requirements 
    . 
    . 
    . 
3.3.1.2.3.x. Security 
      3.3.1.2.3.x.1. Regulatory Statutes 
     3.3.1.2.3.x.2. Data Classification 
     3.3.1.2.3.x.3. Data Handling 
   . 
   . 
   . 
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3.3.1.m. Feature 1.m 
    3.3.1.m.1. Introduction/Purpose of Feature 
    3.3.1.m.2. Stimulus/Response Sequence 
    3.3.1.m.3. Associated Functional Requirements 
    . 
    . 
    . 
3.3.1.m.3.x. Security 
      3.3.1.m.3.x.1. Regulatory Statutes 
     3.3.1.m.3.x.2. Data Classification 
     3.3.1.m.3.x.3. Data Handling 
  3.3.2. User Class 2 
  . 
  . 
  . 
  3.3.n. User Class n 
  . 
  . 
  . 
 3.4. Performance Requirements 
 3.5. Design Constraints 
 3.6. Software System Attributes 
 3.7. Other Requirements   
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